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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 
 This is the second time this contentious dispute has reached us.  Having heard the 
parties at oral argument and reviewed their claims, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order on direct appeal, but will reverse the District Court’s order challenged on cross-
appeal.   
 The factual background is ably reported in the District Court’s opinion and, as the 
parties are intimately familiar with the procedural history of this case, we need not 
recount in detail here.  See Knight et al. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n., 724 F. Supp. 2d 
480, 484-87 (D. Del. 2010).   
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I. 
 First, Appellant Knight maintains that he is entitled to back pay for lost wages 
because his removal from union office infringed on his free speech rights.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 411(a)(2).  He argues that the District Court lacked sufficient evidence to support its 
ruling which denied his lost wages claims.  To the contrary, the District Court’s order is 
amply supported by the record.  For example, Knight was disciplined for engaging in 
conduct detrimental to the Union, which was a violation of the Union’s constitution.  
Knight had also misled McBride into thinking the meeting in question was a union-
sponsored event.  Further, the record reveals that the Union’s disciplinary committee was 
especially troubled because “Brother Knight is the financial secretary of the local and 
should be aware of the restrictions on payments to union officials.” 
 Moreover, the record contains the testimony of disciplinary committee members 
which confirms that accepting funds from the Port Authority officer and subsequently 
misleading McBride were the reasons for his discipline—not because Knight had 
exercised any free speech.  See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 438 (1982).   
 Finally, were we to find Knight’s claim for lost wages valid, we would deem it 
waived.  Knight raised such a claim on summary judgment during the first trial and lost.  
The District Court held that his suspension from union office was not discipline and that 
Knight had failed to present evidence showing that the Union infringed on his free speech 
rights.  After trial, the District Court reconsidered the issue and again ruled that there was 
no evidence to support a violation of Knight’s free speech rights.  This ruling was not 
challenged on appeal.  See Knight v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n., 457 F.3d 331, 335-36 
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(3d Cir. 2006).  An issue that is not addressed in an appellant’s brief is deemed waived on 
appeal and “[w]e have consistently rejected such attempts to litigate on remand issues 
that were not raised in a party’s prior appeal and that were not explicitly or implicitly 
remanded for further proceedings.”.  Skretneck v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 
193, 203 (3d Cir. 2004).  As a result, the law of the case doctrine acts to bar Knight from 
relitigating this issue.  See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 
817 (1988). 
 Nor were these claims somehow resurrected when we remanded this cause 
following his first appeal.  Knight maintains that his claim for back-pay was part of his 
claim that the ILA Constitution was overbroad.  This is not so.  For example, in the first 
appeal, Knight argued that the District Court should not have abstained on the 
overbreadth question, and he won that argument.  We were not presented with the issue 
of whether Knight was entitled to back-pay for lost wages.  We also note that on remand, 
Knight attempted to bring this claim, only to have the District Court correctly determine 
that we remanded for consideration of the overbreadth issue, not the back-pay claims.  
Finally, the fact that the district court refused to disturb its prior ruling on remand, see 
Knight, 724 F.Supp.2d at 497, does not revive Knight’s ability to challenge this claim.  
II. 
 Appellants also believe they are entitled to punitive damages under the LMDRA.  
Even were such damages available under the statute, an issue we will assume without 
deciding, Appellants would not be entitled to them.  We acknowledge that a discrepancy 
exists as to the appropriate standard to be used for awarding such sanctions.  Here, 
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however, whether Appellants must demonstrate actual malice or the lesser standard of 
reckless indifference is immaterial.  Appellants present no evidence to meet even the 
lesser standard for which they advocate. 
 As they did in the District Court, Appellants lay out a lengthy and detailed 
chronology of events which they point to as evidence of a pattern of reckless indifference 
on the part of the ILA.  After considering this chronology, the District Court made the 
following determination:   
In the Court’s view, however, the timeline shows a 
contentious history between the two parties, but not an over-
arching problem of maliciousness or reckless indifference.  In 
particular, the Court is not convinced that the fact Mr. Miller-
Bey was involved in litigation with the ILA previously, on 
different claims and more than a decade before the instant 
action was initiated, supports a claim of reckless indifference 
on the part of the ILA in the instant dispute.  Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not proven that they are 
entitled to punitive damages.   
 
Knight, 724 F.Supp.2d at 502.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion.  The record 
supports its conclusion. 
III. 
On cross-appeal, the Union argues that the District Court erred when it held that 
Knight’s due process rights were violated because he was convicted of conduct with 
which he was never charged.   
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 Our review is plenary.  The District Court ruled that Knight’s due process rights 
were violated because it believed Ethical Practices Counsel Milton E. Mollen
1
 convicted 
Knight of violating the “spirit and intent” of § 302 of the LMRA.  The District Court 
found this ‘conviction’ to be a due process violation because Knight was never charged 
with that offense. 
 Here, the District Court erred.  Although Mollen did use language about Knight 
“violating the spirit and intent” of the statute, he did so in passing, making a point that 
relates directly back to Knight’s accepting money from the Port Authority official – 
conduct with which he was clearly charged (and indeed stipulated to). 
 Mollen’s decision is a thorough opinion of seven pages and sets out the facts, 
arguments and its decision in a forthright and cogent manner, noting that the detrimental 
conduct with which Knight was charged did not refer specifically to a § 302 violation.  
He went on to determine that by accepting money from the Port Authority official, 
Knight did not technically violate any laws because, in this instance, the Port Authority 
was not a public entity.  Still, Mollen did not dismiss the charges against him.  He found 
that Knight violated the “conduct detrimental” provision in the ILA Constitution.  
Basically, Mollen found Knight had engaged in conduct detrimental to the Union, even 
though the payment he received did not technically violate the statute. 
 The District Court concluded that Mollen’s decision amounted to a finding that 
Knight was guilty of “new charges.”  We disagree.  The District Court’s order does not 
                                              
1
 On remand, the District Court ordered a new hearing before an unbiased judge.  The 
Union suggested its Ethical Practices Counsel, and the District Court agreed. 
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reflect the totality of the record.  Mollen indicates quite clearly in his opinion that 
Knight’s conduct was “conduct detrimental” to the Union—indeed he says so throughout 
his opinion (the Union references 8 of these instances in their brief).  Mollen did, in one 
instance, speak about Knight violating the “spirit and intent” of the statute.  But, the 
District Court latched-on to this one comment and disregarded the overall theme to 
Mollen’s opinion—that Knight should not have accepted the money from the Port 
Authority.  Indeed, that was what Knight was charged with: accepting $500.00 from an 
employer of ILA members.  Mollen, therefore, had to determine whether that action was 
“detrimental” to the Union.  Knight stipulated to accepting the money, so he clearly had 
notice of these charges. 
 Mollen concluded that Knight’s actions, although technically legal, still worked to 
the detriment of the Union.  Mollen, as the Union points out in its brief, wanted to make 
sure that ILA officers (like Knight), do not take money from employers, regardless of 
whether it is technically legal to do so.  Therefore, the District Court should have, for due 
process purposes, only concerned itself with whether Knight was apprised of the conduct 
of which he had been charged—taking money from the Port Authority official.  
IV. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s order challenged on direct appeal.  We will 
reverse, however, the District Court’s ruling that Knight’s LMRDA § 105 due process 
rights were violated. 
